Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2009

Consumer Debt - Are Credit Cards Bankrupting
Americans: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commercial & Administrative Law of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong., April 2, 2009
(Statement of Associate Professor Adam J. Levitin,
Geo. U. L. Center)
Adam J. Levitin
Georgetown University Law Center, ajl53@law.georgetown.edu

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cong/50

This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cong
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER
Adam J. Levitin
Associate Professor of Law

Written Testimony of
Adam J. Levitin
Associate Professor of Law
Georgetown University Law Center
Before the
United States House of Representatives
Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law
Hearing: Consumer Debt — Are Credit Cards Bankrupting Americans?
April 2, 2009

Witness Background Statement
Adam J. Levitin in an Associate Professor of Law at the Georgetown University
Law Center, in Washington, D.C., where he specializes in bankruptcy and commercial
law and directs the Georgetown-Hebrew University in Jerusalem Executive LLM
Program in Business and Commercial Law. Before joining the Georgetown faculty,
Professor Levitin practiced in the Business Finance & Restructuring Department of Weil,
Gotshal & Manges, LLP in New York. Professor Levitin has also served as Special
Counsel for Mortgage Affairs for the Congressional Oversight Panel, as an expert witness
for the FTC and FDIC on credit card litigation, and as law clerk to the Honorable Jane R.
Roth on the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Professor Levitin’s research focuses on financial institutions and their role in
consumer and business finance, including credit card and mortgage lending,
securitization, identity theft, DIP financing, and bankruptcy claims trading. His articles
have appeared in numerous law reviews and finance journals and have won the 2007
Editors’ Prize of the American Bankruptcy Law Journal and the 2009 Article Prize of the
American College of Consumer Financial Services Lawyers. Professor Levitin is also a
regular commentator on Credit Slips, a blog devoted to credit and bankruptcy issues.
Professor Levitin holds a J.D. from Harvard Law School, an M.Phil and an A.M.
from Columbia University, and an A.B. from Harvard College, all with honors.
Professor Levitin has not received any Federal grants nor has he received any
compensation in connection with his testimony and does not represent any party with
regard to credit card regulatory issues.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to testify today about credit cards and bankruptcy. The credit card is
one of the great innovations in the American consumer economy in the 20th century.
Credit cards are, in many respects, an excellent product. Credit cards supply consumers
with both an extremely convenient payment method and an easy source of financing.
Credit cards are the dominant method of consumer financing for everyday purchases.
Credit cards, however, are also a product that can misused by both consumers and
card issuers. Consumers can use card irresponsibly, and banks can issue cards and extend
credit limits irresponsibly. Unfortunately, credit card business models and product
design encourage unsustainable and irresponsible lending that leaves consumers mired in
debt and which hurts responsible creditors like small businesses, landlords, tort victims,
and the government. The 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act (BAPCPA) promotes these predatory business models and product designs, and I
urge the Congress to consider repealing key parts of the BAPCPA. I also urge the
Congress to consider more comprehensive credit card reform that includes
standardization of cardholder agreements and simplification of credit card price
structures.
I wish to make four main points in my testimony today:
(1) Credit card debt is a major factor in consumer financial distress and
bankruptcy.
(2) Credit card product design and business models are an important factor in high
levels of card debt.
(3) The BAPCPA encourages credit card product design that fosters unsustainable
credit card lending at the expense of consumers and responsible creditors.
(4) A comprehensive approach should be taken to credit card reform legislation,
and part of that approach should be the standardization of cardholder agreement terms
and the simplification of credit card pricing. Simplified pricing and standardized terms
will allow disclosure to function and make a safer, fairer, and more transparent card
market.
I. CREDIT CARD DEBT IS A MAJOR FACTOR IN CONSUMER FINANCIAL DISTRESS
Credit card debt is a major factor in consumer financial distress. Data on credit
card use and financial distress is limited, but an examination of credit card debt and
bankruptcy filings shows that consumer bankruptcy filers are mired in credit card debt.
87% of consumer bankruptcy filers have credit card debt at their time of filing.1 In 2007,
the median consumer bankruptcy filer with credit card debt had $16,576.00 in credit card
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2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project. The numbers reported in this testimony are slightly lower
than those reported ($17,513.00) in testimony I presented to the Senate Judiciary Committee’s
Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts on a March 24, 2009 hearing. The 2007 CBP
oversamples elderly Americans. This testimony presents figures that have been corrected for that
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debt.2 This accounted for 18% of the median consumer bankruptcy filer’s total debt and
47% of the median consumer’s unsecured debt (including taxes, rent, alimony, utilities,
medical bills, and student loans).3 Credit card debt is, after mortgage debt, the largest
single obligation of most consumer bankruptcy filers.4
To provide some perspective on what $16,576 in card debt means for the median
bankruptcy filer, it is 60% of the gross, pre-tax household income of the median filer with
card debt.5 Consumer bankruptcy filers earn less than the median American household,
but the $16,576 is still over 35% of the median gross annual national income.6 The
relative severity of credit card debt burdens of bankruptcy filers is evident from Chart 1,
which shows levels of credit card debt and gross annual income for the median American
household and the median consumer bankruptcy filer in 2007.
Chart 1. Gross Annual Income and Credit Card Debt

It is not clear how much of consumer bankruptcy filers’ credit card debt is
purchase balances and how much is accrued interest and fees, but if a consumer with
$16,576 in credit card debt at an APR of 18%, made no more purchases, incurred no fees,
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and paid off the debt in five years, the Office of Comptroller of the Currency’s
recommended amortization period for credit card debt, the consumer would have to make
monthly payments of $420.92. These payments would be 18% of the median consumer
debtor with credit card debt’s gross (pre-tax) monthly income, and 11% of the national
median gross (pre-tax) monthly income. For a middle- or lower- income consumer who
also to pay taxes and provide basic necessities of food and shelter for her family, this sort
of debt burden is near impossible. Few consumers can service high interest rates like
credit card default rates from their disposable income, let alone make any headway in
paying down the principal. Not surprisingly, 52% of consumer bankruptcy filers list
credit card debt as a major factor in their bankruptcy. 7
The precise dynamics of credit card debt and financial distress are not well
understood. While Professor Ronald Mann has shown that dollar for dollar, a consumer
with credit card debt is more likely to file for bankruptcy than a consumer with any other
form of debt,8 it is not clear whether card debt generate financial distress in the first
instance or whether consumers in financial distress turn to cards as a source of short-term
financing. In either case, however, credit card debt certainly contributes to financial
distress as the interest and fees on card debt amounts faster than consumers can pay it off.
Credit cards amplify existing debt burdens, and for many families this means credit cards
are financial quicksand.
There are several factors underlying high levels of credit card debt: the
macroeconomic strain of the American family; irresponsible spending; and credit card
product design. High levels of credit card debt reflect the deeper economic problems of
American families: the costs of health care, education, and housing. 9 These basic costs
of living have increased dramatically in recent decades, while incomes have remained
stagnant. Savings rates have plummeted to zero or even negative, and home equity, the
largest single asset of many families, has been depleted. Household finances have been
stretched thin by increased costs of living and stagnant incomes. This means there is no
cushion left for middle class families faced with unpredictable shocks to their income like
death, illness, divorce, or unemployment. Many American families are forced to finance
basic expenses off of cards in order to maintain the same middle class standard of living.
To be sure, there are some individuals who borrow lavishly and irresponsibly on their
credit cards to support a lifestyle far beyond their means, but these are the exception, not
the rule; macroeconomic pressures on the American family are the primary driver of card
debt.
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Card debt is the Scotch tape holding together the middle class. Unfortunately, for
many families, it also exacerbates their financial distress. Simply servicing credit card
debt is a major strain for American families. As Chart 2 shows, even in inflation adjusted
dollars, the amount of interest US households pay on revolving debt (almost all of which
is credit card debt), has grown significantly and is now at over $2,000/year, or over 4% of
gross annual median income. These high levels of credit card debt also discourage
savings for future contingencies and retirement.
Chart 2.

Interest Paid on Revolving Debt Per Household

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Products
Accounts, Table. 2.1.1, Line 29.

II. CREDIT CARD PRODUCT DESIGN AND BUSINESS MODEL FOSTER HIGH LEVELS OF
CARD DEBT
While credit card debt burdens are in part a function of the macroeconomic
problems of the American family, they are also a function of credit card product design.
Credit card product design makes it possible to lend profitably even to high risk
consumers. A traditional creditor lends money with an eye to recovering its principal and
making a profit from the interest. Such a lender cannot lend to overly risky customers, as
loss of principal is devastating to its business model. As a result, a traditional lender will
engage in robust underwriting of its loans.
Credit card issuers hardly engage in robust underwriting; credit cards are almost
all stated income loans, which have come to be better known as “liar loans,” in the

mortgage context. While card issuers will look at credit scores and credit reporting
information, this is extremely thin as underwriting goes—there is no validated
information on income and assets or non-credit-reported debts.
A. The Sweatbox Lending Model
Card issuers are able to engage in unsecured stated-income lending because many
employ a non-traditional lending strategy, one that Professor Ronald Mann of Columbia
Law School has termed “the sweatbox.” Sweatbox lending does not require return of the
principal. Instead, the sweatbox lender makes enough money off of interest and fees that
even if it losses the principal, it will still make a handsome profit.10 Thus, a sweatbox
lender will be willing to make loans that are unsustainable in the long run, so long as it
can extract sufficient profit before the consumer defaults. As explained by Julie L.
Williams, then the Acting Comptroller of the Currency, “Today the focus for lenders is
not so much on consumer loans being repaid, but on the loan as a perpetual earning
asset…it’s not repayment of the amount of the debt that is the focus, but rather the
income the credit relationship generates through periodic payments on the loan,
associated fees, and cross-selling opportunities.”11
Credit card price structures are a key part of the sweatbox model. Credit cards not
only have high interest rates, but they have extremely high back-end fees that are
unrelated to costs, such as late fees and overlimit fees, plus a host of billing tricks and
traps that function as hidden price points. Tricks and traps directly generated over $12
billion in revenue for the card industry in 2007,12 which was over 30% of the industry’s
pre-tax profits.13 By shifting the cost of credit away from prominent, up-front price
points like purchase APR to back-end fees and penalty APRs and billing tricks and traps,
card issuers encourage greater use of cards, thereby increasing the number of consumers
who enter the sweatbox.
B. Interchange Fees
Several other features of credit card product design also encourage riskier lending.
Increasingly, the card industry’s business model is fee-based, not interest based.
Unfortunately, just as with subprime mortgages, the fee-based business model creates a
perverse incentive to lend indiscriminately and ignore delinquencies.
Card issuers make money on every credit card transaction, regardless of whether
the consumer ultimately pays a finance charge. The issuer receives around two percent
of every transaction in a fee paid by the merchant (and passed on to all consumers in the
10
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form of higher prices), called the interchange fee.14 Card issuers will collect about $48
billion in interchange fees this year.15
Because interchange is based on transaction volume, it creates an incentive for
banks to issue as many cards as possible, with little regard to the creditworthiness of the
borrower. By creating a huge revenue stream unrelated to credit risk, interchange
encourages card issuers to engage in less careful underwriting.
C. Securitization
Banks have compounded this problem by shifting much of the loan risk to
investors through securitization. When card issuers securitize credit card debt, they
transform the credit card debt into a pool of assets used to pay off bonds. If the pool
turns out not to be large enough, the bond investors take the loss. But if there’s a surplus,
it goes to the card issuer.
To illustrate, credit card securitization deals typically require that the card issuer
retain an untranched 7% stake in the securitized pool. Many issuers will keep a higher
stake. Suppose an issue has a 15% stake in a pool and the pool needs to pay $100 million
in bonds. If the pool generates revenue of $110 million, the card issuer gets $25 million
($10 million in excess spread + 15% of $100 million). If the pool only generates $90
million in revenue, however, the card issuer losses only $1.5 million (15% of $10 million
in losses).
Because the card issuer retains control of the terms of securitized accounts, it can
easily increase their volatility by applying and increasing penalty interest rates and fees.
Some consumers will default as a result of higher rates and fees, but others will simply
pay more. Because the card issuer has all of the upside and only a fraction of the
downside, there is an incentive for the card issuer to crank up the interest rates and fees.
For example, if a card issuer normally has a 5% default rate for an average balance of
$100, it can expect revenue of $95. If the card issuer raises interest and fees so that
average balances go up to $110, even if default rates go up two and a half times to 12.5%.
While card issuers sell off most of the default risk, they keep any upside that
comes from inflating their fees and rates. If the higher fees and rates cause more defaults,
it is investors who bear the loss. If the higher fees result in more income, however, it is
the card issuer, not the investors, who benefit. Credit card securitization creates a heads I
win, tails you lose situation and leads the banks to increase fees and interest rates on
securitized debt. Interchange and securitization thus make it possible for card issuers to
engage in less careful underwriting, which allows them to apply the sweatbox to even
more consumers, including ones who are less economically stable.
D. Sweatbox Lending and Bankruptcy “Reform”
All lenders lend for profit, of course, but a lender who lends with an eye to getting
its principal repaid and making a profit from the interest is a very different type of lender
than one who lends with an eye to turning the consumer into a “perpetual earning asset.”
14

Technically, the interchange fee is the fee paid by the merchant’s bank to the issuer, but this fee
is simply passed along to the merchant as is the bulk of the “merchant discount fee.” See Levitin, supra
note Error! Bookmark not defined..
15
Merchants Payments Coalition.

No matter how greedy a lender is, a lender that is looking to get back its principal, cannot
squeeze a consumer too hard lest it push the consumer into default. A lender that doesn’t
care about getting principal repaid, as much as about extracting maximum payments from
the consumer will squeeze much harder. This business model resulted in things like the
“interest only” and “pay option ARM” mortgages that are currently wreaking havoc on
the economic. It is an inherently reckless business model because even if lenders do not
want consumers to default, they lack sufficient information to make sure that they do not
end up pushing the consumer into default. The sweatbox lending model is predatory and
unsuited for sustainable lending.
There are two keys to making the sweatbox lending model work. First, the “heat”
must be high enough—interest rates and fees must be lathered on. Card issuers have
shown that they are expert at this. And second, the consumer must be kept in the
sweatbox as long as possible. As Professor Mann has observed, the longer the consumer
can be kept in the sweatbox of making minimum payments that exceed the cost of funds
before eventually defaulting, the more profitable the loan. Bankruptcy is an escape hatch
from the sweatbox. Thus, anything the lender can do to delay the default, such as making
it more difficult to file for bankruptcy, allows the lender to extract greater revenue from
the consumer.
The aim of keeping consumers in a lending sweatbox for as long as possible
explains key parts of the BAPCPA, in particular the means test and credit counseling
requirements.
III. THE BAPCPA BENEFITS CREDIT CARD ISSUERS
AND OTHER CREDITORS

AT THE

EXPENSE

OF

DEBTORS

The centerpiece of the BAPCPA was the “means test” that determines which
consumers are eligible for filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The means test is a rubric for
a complex statutory provision regarding whether a rebuttable presumption of abuse exists
for a consumer debtor to file for Chapter 7 and who can raise the presumption. If a
consumer bankruptcy filer’s adjusted income is too high, then a presumption of abuse
exists against the consumer. If the debtor’s filing is found to be an abuse of Chapter 7’s
provisions, then the case must be dismissed or converted to Chapter 13 or 11.
Whatever one thinks about means testing as a general policy matter, there is broad
consensus that the current means test is poorly drafted and ineffective. There has been no
noticeable impact on the income of consumers filing for bankruptcy before or after the
2005 amendments; the median income and the distribution of income of bankruptcy filers
in 2001 was virtually identical to filers in 2007.16 As the most recent empirical study of
the impact of BAPCPA on bankruptcy filings notes, “instead of functioning like a sieve,
carefully sorting the high-income abusers from those in true need, the amendments’
means test functioned more like a barricade, blocking out hundreds of thousands of
struggling families indiscriminately, regardless of their individual income

16

Robert M. Lawless, et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical Study of Consumer
Debtors, 82 A M. BANKR. L.J. 349, 358-63 (2008).

circumstances.”17 This is not what the bill was marketed as doing. It “was not the
Bankruptcy Numbers Reduction Act; it was the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention Act.”18
The credit card industry’s goal with the 2005 amendments, however, was not to
sort out can-pay debtors or to extract greater payouts in bankruptcy. Instead, the card
industry sought to delay bankruptcy filings. Delayed bankruptcy filings boost credit card
industry profits. The 2005 amendments, in particular the documentation required for
means testing and the requirement of pre-bankruptcy credit counseling, add delay directly
to the filing process. They also encourage delay for debtors who wish to avoid the abuse
presumption of the means test; it is relatively easy for a debtor to game the means test,
but to do so requires delaying a filing by some months. And the 2005 amendments add
cost to the filing process, and cost adds further delay, as many consumers file for
bankruptcy not because of an exigent need, like to prevent a mortgage foreclosure, but
when they have saved up enough money to file.
Because bankruptcy distributions on unsecured debt are made pro rata, delayed
filings benefits creditors, like credit card issuers, with higher interest rates. Their claims
grow relatively faster than unsecured creditors who charge no or low rates of interest,
such as tort claimants, medical bills, landlords, local merchants and small businesses, and
federal, state, and local government. Because distributions on unsecured debt are made
pro rata, it is a zero sum game; to the extent that card issuers’ claims are larger because of
delay it comes at the expense of other creditors.
This can be seen when one compares pre-BAPCPA debt burdens of bankruptcy
filers to post-BAPCPA debt burdens. From 2001 to 2007, median secured debt rose
20.8% and median unsecured debt (primarily credit cards) rose 43.6%.19 Delayed filings
only leave debtors more deeply mired in debt (not all of which is dischargeable, thus
limiting the potency of the bankruptcy “fresh start”), and may delay filings past the
prudent point. The delay comes at the expense of creditors who charge more manageable
rates of interest. And means testing adds a significant burden to the court system.
Whatever one thinks of the policy of means testing and related measures supposedly
designed to prevent bankruptcy “abuse,” they have been unsuccessful on their own terms;
BAPCPA has delayed and kept down bankruptcy filings in general, rather than screened
out abusers.20 The abuse prevention measures in BAPCPA were also unnecessary; the
Bankruptcy Code already gave creditors the ability to challenge debtors’ discharges,21 but
credit card issuers rarely litigated under these provisions.
Eliminating the means test and credit counseling requirements for bankruptcy
filers would make it cheaper and simpler to file for bankruptcy and would discourage
card issuers from sweatbox lending that pushes many consumers into bankruptcy and
exacerbates the economic problems of the already-stretched American family.
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IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR CREDIT CARD REFORM LEGISLATION
A. The Need for Comprehensive Card Reform Legislation
Credit cards play an important role in the American economy, but they also cause
significant problems and exacerbate others. The current financial crisis underscores the
important of consumer protection for the health of the entire economy, and the Congress
has rightly taken a keen interest in credit card reform legislation. The credit card reform
legislation that has been proposed, however, takes a piecemeal approach. There are bills
that deal with billing practices, with bankruptcy, with interchange, with usury, and with
establishing a federal financial product safety commission. These are all important
issues, but they are also intertwined. Therefore, I urge Congress to consider taking a
comprehensive approach to credit card reform legislation. Issues like bankruptcy, billing
practices, interchange, securitization, and usury are all intimately linked, and would be
best addressed comprehensively, rather than piecemeal.
B. Limitations with Current Approaches to Credit Card Regulation
I would also urge the Congress to recognize that the there are significant
drawbacks to the two primary methods of card regulation used to date: disclosure
regulations and substantive regulations.
1. Disclosure Regulation
Disclosure has been the primary paradigm for card regulation since the 1968
Truth-in-Lending Act. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that it works for complex
financial products like credit cards. While disclosure is effective for simple financial
products where consumers can compare one or a few price terms, it cannot work for
credit cards. Credit cards are different from virtually every other consumer financial
product in their complexity. Most consumer credit products, such as auto loans,
mortgages, and student loans have only one or two price points. These price points do
not vary except in relation to an objective index, such as the Federal Funds Rate or
LIBOR. Unlike other common consumer credit products, however, credit cards have an
astounding array of price points: annual fees, merchant fees, teaser interest rates, base
interest rates, balance transfer interest rates, cash advance interest rates, overdraft
advance interest rates, default interest rates, late fees, overlimit fees, balance transfer
fees, cash advance fees, international transaction fees, telephone payment fees, etc.
These are all explicit prices points, disclosed in Truth-in-Lending schedules.
The sheer number of explicit prices points that make it difficult for consumers to
accurately and easily gauge the total cost of using credit cards.22 Consumers are not
capable of doing the on-the-spot calculations necessary to figure out whether or not to use
any particular credit card for any particular transaction. There is too much information
that the consumer must process. Even if the consumer could process all this information,
it simply would not be worthwhile to do for every transaction. The burden this would
impose would negate all of the convenience benefits credit cards have for consumers.
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Consumers’ difficulty in determining the cost of credit cards is compounded by
credit cards’ hidden price points in the form of billing practices, such as universal crossdefault, unilateral term changes, residual interest, two-cycle billing, unlimited overlimit
fees, application of payments to the lowest interest rate balance, non-standard use of
terms like “fixed rate” and “Prime rate,” and unclear policies as to precisely when a
payment is due. These billing practices make credit card pricing to vary based not only
on objective indices, but also on the card issuers’ subjective whim. Credit card billing
practices alter the application of the explicit price points and make the effective cost of
using credit cards higher than disclosed. These billing practices further obfuscate the true
cost of using credit and make it virtually impossible for a consumer to make a fully
informed decision about whether to use credit and, if so, which credit card product to use.
2. Substantive Regulation
Substantive regulations, like usury laws and unfair and deceptive acts and
practices (UDAP) statutes are able to address specific egregious card industry practices.
Strong substantive regulations can have the unintended consequences of product
substitute and credit rationing. But even more limited substantive regulation can result in
term substitution: card issuers will simply substitute new terms for the regulated ones.
Thus, legislating against specific practices inevitably devolve into a game of regulatory
Whac-A-Mole: every time regulators put the kibosh on one practice, the card industry
invents another to take its place. The card industry has shown itself to be remarkably
resourceful in engineering its products around regulation. Congress will always be
playing catch-up in this game of regulation and innovation. A dedicated federal
regulatory agency, like a consumer financial product safety commission would be able to
move faster than Congress, but even then it might not move fast enough.
C. A New Approach to Card Regulation: Standardization and Simplification
The only sure way to stop negative innovation in the card industry is to flip the
regulatory model on its head. Currently card issuers are allowed to do anything, except
specific prohibited practices. The better regulatory structure would be to prohibit
anything, except for specific permitted practices. Such a regulatory model could be
combined with a mandatory simplification of credit card price structures. All of credit
cards’ myriad price points can be boiled down into three price terms: an availability fee,
a transaction fee, and an interest rate. Congress would do well to mandate that these and
only these three fees may be charged by card issuers, and to require standardization of
key cardholder agreement terms, just as is currently done with insurance policies. Card
issuers would be free to compete and price as they wish within this focused structure.
The benefits of mandating standardization and simplification of credit card price
structures are that consumers would be able to easily and simply compare cards on an
“apples-to-apples” basis that would give them the entire picture of the costs involved
with a card. There would be no worries about the fine print and no hidden fees or price
points designed to take advantage of consumers’ tendency to overestimate their future
ability to repay and underestimate the costs of delayed fees and interest.
While standardization would come at the price of some product differentiation,
the variation among credit cards currently is insignificant—consider Capital One’s
present advertising campaign, which touts the special feature of Capital One’s cards: that

a cardholder can choose the picture that goes on the card. Instead, what one would
expect to emerge would be a (much-needed) bifurcation to occur in the card market.
There should emerge a market for cards aimed at transactors and another aimed at
revolvers. Those aimed at transactors, would feature high interest rates, but low per
transaction fees, while those cards aimed at revolvers would have higher transaction fees,
but lower interest rates.
None of this would solve the problem of consumers’ inability to accurately
predict whether they would revolve or merely transact, and many consumers alternate
between the two. But by simplifying card pricing structure, consumers would be able to
at least pick the lowest cost card in either category, and this would push down interest
rates (and eliminate back-end fees). Without inefficiently high interest rates and backend fees, the sweatbox lending model cannot work, and the card industry would have to
go back to safer, more sustainable, and non-predatory traditional lending models.
I urge the Congress to take up a comprehensive program of credit card reform
legislation. While repealing parts of the BAPCPA is a key element to creating a fair and
sustainable card lending industry, that alone will not eliminate predatory lending models.
Instead, I strongly urge the Congress to consider mandating term standardization and
price structure simplification for credit cards.

